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Social developments

We have seen above that an adequate Islamic intellectual tnilieu still remains to be created in the Muslim world. Until this is achieved, little can be done to Start the necessary debate on socio-moral issues, a debate which must be uninhibited, self-confident, non-controversialist and non-apologetic. Nevertheless, a good deal of writing on social issues has taken place, and much actual social change is taking place in Muslim society. The primary reasons for this are, as we have noted before, first that the actual impact of the modern West on Muslim society has been largely on the socio-political front; and, secondly, that the main criticisms of Islamic society both by Christian missionaries and orientalists have been on these very aspects. The early Westernizing Modernists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Sayyid Amir 'Ali advocated almost without demur the adoption of modern Western concepts of the family (particularly with regard to the Status of women), and equally of modern Western forms of democracy. Indeed, while speaking about Jamal al-DIn al-Afghani, we also said that the democratization of the State was even seen as an internal necessity, in order to build up strong governments based on the popular will. So far as reforms in family law in particular and the Status of women in general are concerned, a very large number of Muslim states have actually enacted legislation, taking up the threads from the early Modernists, and in spite of the strong reaction which was directed against this early Modernism by the revivalists and the conservatives. In Pakistan, for example, although even the most important thinker of this Century, Muhammad Iqbäl, had thrown his weight practically on the side of the conservatives on social issues, the Family Laws Ordinance was promulgated in i960. The conservative 'ulama' and their followers, no doubt, continue to exert pressure for the restoration of the traditional Status quo, but the Modernist minority in Muslim countries, relatively small but vigorous, is politically influential, and holds the initiative, and it looks as though it is impossible for the conservatives to reverse this movement. There is no doubt that on this question the Modernist's stand is on surer grounds, and is helped by the conviction that the new legislation will tighten up the conditions of family life in Muslim society. The conservative or the revivalist, therefore, despite his ostensible appeal to Islam, feels in his heart of hearts that he is on shaky moral grounds in defending the traditional pattern.



The main problem before the Modernist is,. indeed, not primarily whether he will succeed in actually changing society within an Islamic framework. Here the Modernist's attempts are often vitiated by the fact that, instead of facing the problem squarely and on intellectual grounds, he tries to circumvent it and is forced to rely on external patchwork. For example, he may often try to show that the Qur'an does not really allow polygamy at all, and invents explanations.for ist apparent permission of polygamy which are unfaithful to history, and sometimes violate Arabic linguistic usage. He is on surer grounds when, for example, he contends that the Qur'an did allow polygamy, but at the same time put conditions upon it which show that monogamy is better than polygamy, and that, therefore, the drift of the Qur'anic doctrine is towards monogamy. He would be on still surer grounds if, on all legislation which touches socio-economic life and political institutions, he were frankly to give due importance to the social and historical conditions of the Prophet's time; and, having thus made füll allowance for the particular historical context, he were honestly to attempt to enunciate the genuine values of the Qur'än, and to re-embody these values in present conditions. But, for one thing, he has not yet developed the adequate intellectual equipment for this task calling as it does for historical criticism, and, for another, one sometimes suspects that even his conviction that society is really changing fails him. This second factor puts him psychologically in an ambivalent State which further impedes the adoption of an honest and bold stand. It is also true that, to a considerable extent, the development of a genuine Muslim Modernism is hampered-by the fact that controversy between the Christian West and the Muslim East, which was started by the Christian West, has befogged the intellectual tnilieu, and even the sincere Modernist is sometimes affected by the attitudes of the revivalists. It is necessary to control this controversial spirit, and to concentrate on the genuine issues facing the community itself. Whereas the development of social modernization has assumed a clear-cut line, on political philosophy the issues are as yet much less clear. There are two main problems. First, the question of the relatioriship of nationalism to a universal Islamic \Jmma has neither been faced nor answered. We have noted -that, during the struggle for political liberation, local nationalisms have played a very prominent role, but that in that context, nationalism has acted in alliance with the Islamic sentiment. In certain countries, Islamic sentiment has played the more prominent role of the two. In Algeria, for example, and in the Maghrib in general, the doctrine oijibäd as preached by the militant liberationists to the masses, was of decisive importance. In Turkey, on the other hand, the natibnalist sentiment became very strong, and, indeed, it is only in Turkey that a secular nationalist State has been officially established. But in Turkey, again, the Turks cherish a lively sentiment for the larger Islamic Community, although the issue has not been seriously tackled on the intellectual level. Nor can anybody seriously think that the doctrine of the 'Three Concentric Circles' enunciated by the Egyptian president, Jamal 'Ab'd al-Näsir, offers the hope of any real Solution. What one can safely say is that among the masses throughout the Muslim countries, there exists a very strong sentiment for some form of ünity of the Islamic world.

The second question in regard to the nature of the State is the problem of democracy. The contention of the early Modernists that the governments must be based on the populär will through some form of representation is generally accepted; and in fact the Modernist contends, not without plausibility, that since Islam is democratic in its ethos, the adoption of modern democratic institutions cannot be un-Islamic. But the problem does not stop here, and is further complicated by two important factors. First, in all these countries there is a relatively small minority which is educated in the modern sense, and which controls affairs, while the vast majority are illiterate. It is not easy to implement democracy under such circumstances. On major and clear-cut national questions, it is true, even an uneducated person mäy.be able to perceive the issues clearly, but in a democracy not all issues that are debated are so clear-cut. But even more acute than lack of education, although undoubtedly allied to it, is the question of rapid economic development, which is a common problem in the under-developed countries, including all the Muslim countries. The economicproblem has many ramifications, including the moral demands for honesty, integrity and a sense of responsibility. The exigency of the Situation further demands a very high degree of centralized planning and control of economic development. This is feit to necessitate much stabler and stronger governments than would be the case if democracy were superficially and ;nominally allowed to work. It is this ubiquitous phenomenon which results in the appearance of strong men to give stability to these countries, primarily in the interests of economic growth. From the Islamic point of view, there can be no härm in this, provided that, at the same time, the spirit of democracy is genuinely and gradually cultivated among the people.



Education

All Muslim countries have adopted modern educational institutions in the form of universities, academies and Colleges. This fact itself constitutes one of the most important, probably the most important, fact of social change. It is almost universally true that when these institutions. were first adopted by Muslim peoples, they represented modern Western secular education with primary emphasis on ist technological aspects. The idea behind this has been that, since the traditional society of Islam had put too much emphasis on spirituality, the balance should be restored by the inculcation of modern technological skills. A combination of modern technology, with its vast potentiality for the production of goods, and the traditional Spiritual heritage would, it was thought, regenerate the classical glory and greatness ofMuslim society. It is, however, obviously doubtful whether the superficial thesis of a marriage between Eastern spirituality and modern Western technology is meaningful or tenable. Along with the technical and scientific subjects, modern philosophy and thought were also taught, while the seats of traditional learning continued side by side with modern educational institutions. The first problem arising from this phenomenon that has a direct bearing on social change is the education of women. An increasingly large number of modern Colleges and universities are co-educational. Although there is still a certain amount of resistance to the large-scale education of women and particularly to co-education, there is little doubt that female education is fait accompli. Its sociological consequences are, of course, far-reaching and will bear fruit in their fullness in a few decades' time.

But the more important educational problem is the Integration of the new and the old; or, rather, the assimilation of the ever increasing content of modern knowledge with Islamic culture and its values. It is primarily a lack of Integration that has so far resulted in a fundamental dichotomy of the Muslim society. To begin with, it is obvious that the simple borrowing of a foreign System of education, shorn of the Spiritual, moral and cultural basis which gave birth to it, is not likely to produce results, unless a new and adequate basis for it is created from Islamic tradition and its values. As pointed out before, even with regard to pure technology, it is more than doubtful whether it will lead to the material creativity envisaged, unless it is made the proper instrument of a system of values adequately adjusted to it. Among the countries of the East, only Japan seems to make great technological headway while keeping its traditional cultural background. But developments in Japan after the Second World War render this view much less acceptable, since during the past two decades, the religiocultural heritage of Japan has itself been invaded by new ideas on a large scale. To put the matter quite concretely, an engineer may know how to build a bridge; but why he should build one, and with what efficiency and zeal, depend entirely on the values that motivate him. His skill, therefore, must be made part and parcel of a total cultural pattern. But leaving technology a&tde, the modern humanities of the West themselves are replete with certain moral and cultural values which may be said to belong to the Western tradition, and some, indeed, may be traced back clearly to Christianity. Indeed, it is doubtful whether such a seemingly purely rational System of philosophy as that of Immanuel Kant would have been possible without the Christian tradition. This raises questions of a fundamental order for Muslim society and for ist assimilation, modification, or rejection, of the content even of purely Western thought.

But the Muslim world is not intellectually equipped to undertake this task as yet. It is only when the modern and the traditional Systems of education are properly combined and adjusted that intellectuals will arise adequate to meet this challenge. At the moment, by and large, the traditional seats oflearning continue to function separately from modern universities. So far it is only at al-Azhar in Cairo that certain subjects of modern humanities are taught side by side with traditional subjects, but it is doubtful if their level is very high or their effects are very deep. In Pakistan, the traditional madrasas strongly resist any encroachment upon their time-honoured and age-worn curricula, and the teaching of Islam in the modern universities, which has started since Independence, is very limited in its nature and rather ineffective. The teachers, and certainly the trainees, in these 'Departments of Islamiyyat', are not even equipped with the primary instruments of Islamic studies such as the Arabic language. A real, effective renaissance of Islam is not possible until educational developments reach the point of contributing from an Islamic Standpoint to the humanities of the world at large.





1 Об апологетическом подходе к «западной» социологическим школам представителями советской социологии см.: Amsler, S. The Politics of Knowledge in Central Asia. (London and New York, 2009).

2 S. Abashin & S. Gorshenina (eds.) Cahiers d'Asie centrale, N° 17/18: Le turkestan russe: Une colonie comme les autres? (Tashkent & Paris: IFEAC, 2009) pp. 7-14.

3 О проблематике реориентализма по отношению к региону Центральной Азии см.: Huber, A., «Green Tibetans» in: Korom, F.J. (ed.) Tibetan Culture in the Diapora (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), pp. 103-119.

4 Учёные уже отмечали условность значимости дат как рубежей исторических перемен. О важности 1990 года по сравнению с 1989 см. статьи Нового Литературного Обозрения, 2007/№ 83.

5 О зарождении конструкта «брежневский загнивающий социализм» см.: Яковлев, А.Н. Сумерки. Изд. 2-е, доп. и перераб. - Москва: Материк, 2005.

6 О введении конструкта «командно-административная система» в общественные дискуссии периода перестройки см.: Кирчик, О., «История как экономика или путешествие из 1921 в 1906 через 1990», Новое Литературное Обозрение, № 83, 2007. http://nlobooks.ru/sites/default/files/old/nlobooks.ru/rus/magazines/nlo/196/329/351/index.html

7 Raviot, Jean-Robert, „Ecology and the deep forces of perestroika“, Diogenes, 2002, Vol. 49, Issue 2. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-86063310/ecology-and-deep-forces.html


8 См., например: Митрохин, Н. ««Борьба с национализмом» и политическая история СССР 1960-1970-х годов», Неприкосновенный Запас, № 78 (4/2011) http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/1139

9 О пактах между первыми секретарями союзных Республик Средней Азии и Москвой см.: Collins, K., “The Logic of Clan Politics. Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories” in World Politics 56 (January 2004) pp. 235-243.

10 В проекте участвуют: проф. Ж.Болдбаатар (Улаанбаатар Их Сургууль), М.Энхбаатар (Монгол Улсын Их Сургууль), к.п.н. Т. Умбеталиева (Центральноазиатский Фонд Развития Демократии, Алма-Ата), С. Оразбекова, д.ф.н. Г. Айтпаева и А. Тургангазиева (культурно-исследовательский центр Айгине) и автор статьи.

11 Ирина Гордеева, «Преодолевая «Великий Отказ»: Социальная база независимого мирного движения в СССР в 80-е годы XX в. » (неопубликованная статья)

12 Из интервью с работниками культуры центрального драматического театра города Оша. Интервью записаны Айнурой Тургангазиевой и Ириной Морозовой, Ош, апрель 2012.

13 Ильин, В. Государство и социальная стратификация советского и постсоветского обществ (1917-1996). Сывтывкар: изд-во Сывтывкарского Университета, 1996. Глава 8.


14 См.: Абашин, С. Национализмы в Центральной Азии. В поисках идентичности. (Ст.-Петербург: Алетея, 2007), с. 223-228; Муминов, А. Родословное древо Мухтара Ауезова. (Алматы: Жибек Жолы, 2011).

15 В таком ключе написаны многие работы как западных, так и монгольских авторов. См., например: Rossabi, Morris. Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists (Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 2005); Болдбаатар, Ж. Монголчууд Дэлхий Дахины Тüüхнээ (Улаанбаатар: MУИС, 2007).

16 Об этих сюжетах см.: Morozova, I., "Political parties against the background of neo-liberal reform in present Mongolia" in The Journal of The Mongolian Society, Bloomington: Indiana University, Volume XXXII, 2010, pp. 65-68.

17 Мода на «запад» стала способом социологизации молодёжи не только в столицах Республик, но и в городах на периферии. Интервью, записанные Айнурой Тургангазиевой и автором в Оше, апрель 2012.

18 Из интервью автора, записанных в Чимкенте, июнь 2011.

19 Ries, N. Russian Talk. Culture and Conversation in Russia during Perestroika. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

20 Интервью, записанное М.Энхбаатаром и автором этой статьи в Улангоме, Увс аймак, август 2012.

21 Анализ содержания газетных материалов казахстанских СМИ 1982-1991 годов выполнен Салтанат Оразбековой (Алма-Ата, Берлин, 2011).

22 См., например: 1990-й: опыт изучения недавней истории: Сборник статей и материалов. В 2-х томах. — М.: Новое литературное обозрение, 2011.

23 Morozova, I., „On the causes of socialism deconstruction: Elitist discourses and people’s perceptions in contemporary Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia“, IISAN, No. 2, (Leiden, 2012), pp. 6-7.

24 Beissinger, M.R. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 77-79, 155-160.

25 Здесь и далее цитаты из: Актуальные вопросы перестройки. В помощь лектору. (Алма-Ата: Общество «Знание» Казахской ССР, 1988) (4.05 сдано в печать)

26 Имя и фамилия респондента изменены. Развёрнутое интервью с ним было записано Айнурой Тургангазиевой и автором этой статьи в Бишкеке в апреле 2012 г.

27 Как справедливо заметил А.И. Фурсов в своих интервью, - при раздувании мифа о «цивилизованном капиталистическом обществе» в Советском Союзе никто не вспоминал и не желал замечать того, что мировая система капитализма неравновесна, и наравне с обществами Северной Европы, существуют разрушенные индонезийские деревни и чёрные гетто в столицах стран Латинской Америки.

28 Экономический анализ см.: Friedman, L.A., „Living Standards and National Security of Central Asian Countries“ in: Morozova, I. (ed.) Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005), pp. 161-188.

29 Saroyan, M. “Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union” in Solomon, S.G. (ed.) Beyond Sovietology: Essays in Politics and History (New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993) pp. 23-52.

30 Подробные биографии и портреты монгольских революционеров см. в книге Рощина С.К., Политическая история Монголии (1921-1940 гг.) Москва: ИВ РАН, 1999, С. 53-78.

31 См.: Адибеков Г.М., Шахназарова Э.Н., Шириня К.К., Организационная структура Коминтерна, 1919-1943. Москва, 1997.


32 Ф. 495. Оп. 2. Д. 188. Л. 10.

33 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 4. Л. 24.

34 Майский И.М., Монголия накануне революции. Москва, 1960, С. 38-39.

35 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 3. Л. 4.

36 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 175. Л. 134.

37 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 3. Л. 2.

38 Ф. 495. Оп. 152 Д. 7. ЛЛ. 6-7.

39 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 24.

40 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 51.

41 Цибиков Б., Разгром Унгерновщины. Улан-Удэ, 1947, С. 126.

42 Революционные мероприятия Народного правительства Монголии в 1921-1924 годах. Москва, 1960, С. 31-33.

43 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 3. Л. 2.

44 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 5. Л. 9.

45 См. вступление стр.

46 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 5. Л. 29.

47 Рощин С.К., Проблемы Новейшей Истории Монголии (20-30 годы). Москва: ИВ РАН, 1997, С. 40.

48 Советский план в борьбе с Унгерном заключался в выкуривании последнего из Урги и завлечении к российским границам, «чтобы он намаялся». Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 9. ЛЛ. 10-11.

49 Цибиков Б., Разгром Унгерновщины. Улан-Удэ, 1947, С. 122.

50 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 9. Л. 46.

51 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 141.

52 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 112.

53 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 78.

54 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 141.

55 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 54.

56 Национальный архив республики Бурятия. Ф. Р-477. Оп. 1. Д. 84. ЛЛ. 8, 11.

57 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. ЛЛ. 54, 78.

58 В 1921 году термин «автономная Монголия» исчез из официальных советско-монгольских документов, речь шла о «свободной» Монголии. В соглашение между Советской Россией и Монголией, подписанное 5 ноября 1921 года, вообще не вошли статьи о международно-правовом статусе Внешней Монголии и её отношениях с Китаем. В советско-китайских документах вопрос о Внешней Монголии решался в пользу автономии в составе Китая. Подробнее см.: Лузянин С.Г., Россия – Монголия – Китай в первой половине ХХ в. Политические взаимоотношения в 1911-1946 гг. Москва, 2000, С. 103-104.

59 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 54.

60 Там же.

61 Там же.

62 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. ЛЛ. 77-78.

63 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. ЛЛ. 77-78.

64 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 77.

65 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 128.

66 «Внутреннее расслоение ламства» – идея Коминтерна о классовой борьбе внутри ламаистской церкви: бедные низшие ламы, угнетаемые зажиточными высшими, должны были подняться и восстать против последних. Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 5. Л. 29.

67 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 141.

68 Рощин С.К., Политическая история Монголии (1921-1940 гг.). Москва: ИВ РАН, 1999, С. 59.

69 «Только в 1924 году, задним числом, было решено именовать мартовское совещание 1921 года в Кяхте I съездом, а съезд 1923 года – II съездом», Рощин С.К., Политическая история Монголии (1921-1940 гг.). Москва: ИВ РАН, 1999, С. 148.

70 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 25. Л. 8.

71 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 25. ЛЛ. 10-13.

72 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 31. Л. 60.

73 Параллели между Золотой Ордой и Советским Союзом просматриваются на геополитическом уровне: то же географическое пространство, экспансионистская политика. На этом любят спекулировать евразийцы.

74 Jacob Seiden, The Mongol impact on Russia from the 13th century to the present: Mongol contributions to the political institutions of Muscovy, Imperial Russia, and the Soviet state (volumes I-III). Georgetown University, Ph.D., 1971, P. 1005.

75 Крадин Н.Н., Империя Хунну. Владивосток, 1996, С. 15.

76 «Обращение по поводу распространения слухов». См.: Революционные мероприятия Народного правительства Монголии в 1921-1924 гг. Москва, 1960, С. 39-42.


77 См. библиографический раздел. С.

78 См.: Хара-Даван, Эрэнжэн, Чингис-хан как полководец и его наследие. Элиста, 1991, С. 32-33, 47, 59.

79 См.: Dashpurev D., Soni S.K., Reign of Terror in Mongolia 1920-1990. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1992.

80 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 76.

81 Ф. 495. Оп. 154. Д. 106. Л. 83, 121.

82 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 9. ЛЛ. 50-51.

83 «О личностях отдельных руководителей аймаков (Из блокнота монгольского работника). См.: Элбек-Доржи Ринчино о Монголии. Избранные труды. Улан-Удэ, 1998, С. 134-135.

84 Там же, С. 135.

85 Там же, С. 137.

86 Там же, С. 138.

87 Там же.

88 Там же, С. 138-139.

89 О Джа-ламе см.: Ломакина, Инесса, Голова Джа-ламы. Улан-Удэ – С.-Петербург, 1993.

90 Материалы IV съезда Монгольского Революционного Союза Молодёжи 17-22 октября 1925, доклад Нацова. См.: Революционная молодёжь Монголии. Улан-Батор, 1925, С. 26.

91 Forbath, Ladislaus as related by Geleta, Joseph, The New Mongolia. London-Toronto, 1936, P. 221.

92 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 21. Л. 7.

93 Революционные мероприятия Народного правительства Монголии в 1921-1924 гг. Москва, 1960, С. 124-126.

94 Там же: «Постановление об изъятии у лам Великого Шабинского ведомства печатей на право владения аратами-хамджилга», С. 104-105.

95 Революционная молодёжь Монголии. Улан-Батор, 1925, С. 62.

96 Ф. 495. Оп. 152. Д. 4. Л. 330.

97 «К последним событиям в Монголии. Народная партия и Союз молодёжи. О соглашательстве партии. Урга, 17 сентября 1924 г.» См.: Элбек-Доржи Ринчино о Монголии. Избранные труды. Улан-Удэ, 1998, С. 96.

98 Там же, С. 13.

99 Конституция лишала избирательных прав бывших князей и буддийских иерархов, а также монастырских лам.

100 См.: Основной закон (Конституция) МНР и приложения: Монгольское законодательство. Вып. 1, Улан-Батор, 1928.


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